Our environmental crisis, and especially global climate change, requires innovative rethinking of our relation to the non-human world. Levinas's general idea of ethics based on his notion of the Ot religion, education, psychology, as well as philosophy. There is a growing debate about how his powerful ideas can be used to rethink our relation to the non-human world in response to the environment crisis. 1 Levinas's insights to the nonthat Levinas's exclusivist focus on the human other doesn't grow out of the concept of the other itself but is an arbitrary limitation, and suggests that the notion of face can be extended to the non-human.
and the environmental crisis are best developed from his ideas about society and justice, rather than at the ethical level of the face-to-face.
to think with Levinas about the non-human, each of these are worthwhile contributions to thinking with Levinas about our environmental crisis.
there are other resources within Levinas's thought that have been overlooked, particularly his notions of il y a and hypostasis, as well as the elemental and sensibility. I would like to use these to build a case for a Levinasian approach that is different from a stewardship ement, and that doesn't require us to thin out his idea of the face. Clearly we need a more robust notion of non-human beings, one resistant to the possibility of exploitation through intentional constinotion of the non-human as something that is self-expressive and that is in an ethical relation with humans.
In his early writings, Levinas develops the notion of il y a as his -distinguishes between an "ex thought experiment, he asks us to imagine away all familiar things. 2 We might be tempted to say that there is nothing left, but that is not his view. Levinas maintains, "The absence of everything returns as a presence, as the place where the bottom has dropped out of everything, an atmospheric density, a plenitude of the void, or the murmur 3 What remains is not nothing but bare existing, without the familiar existents in the world. Levinas names this il y a 2 Existence and Existents s-impersonal, anonymous, yet inextinguishable 'consummation' of being, which murmurs in the depths of nothingness itself we shall designate by the term there is [il y a ective or situatof forces associated with existing. Il y a remains as a presence in the absence of everything familiar and determinate, something Levinas calls existing without existents.
occur, Levinas does give an informative story of the relationship between existents in the world and il y a il y a, n event, an irruption from the impersonal il y a, something which shows up most primoritear in il y a that interrupts its anonymity. So we can say that existents populating the world are local, bodily irruptions in the anonymity of bare existing, il y a. The local existent is not an objective body, existent, a subject.
Levinas uses the Greek word hypostasis to name the event of conan existent by tearing away from bare existence. In such a withdrawal, the existent contacts its own existing, as if part of reality falls back onto itself, thereby rupturing bare existence enough to become a means "the arising, out of anonymous being, of an independent being that is nameable, one that can be isolated in time and place in the 4 in Levinas own words, its arising is "a rupture of the anonymous vigilance of the there is [il y a stated before, the existent can well be thought of as subjectivity, for because of its escape from the anonymity of il y a, it closes itself off from bare existence by binding the existence to itself. This achieveirruption becomes an interiority, something separate that can relate to outside events. Instead, it can better be thought of as an event that is evanescent, a seemingly dormant, it is still an accomplishment, for the irruption that is the existent involves continual fresh starts of interrupting the murmur of impersonal il y a. 6 The inevitable evanescence of every present instant means that "being [hypostasis] is never inherited but always won in the lasting endurance, it always involves new beginnings.
nstead, the primal freedom of new beginnings. The very continuing presence of the existent shows this freedom. It is the freedom born ting is a verb for Levinas, the perpetual mastering of existence by the exis iaateriality accompanies-necessarily-the upsurge of the subject in its condition for its centring and freedom.
I would like to make use of il y a to understanding differently the nonil y a needs to be deepened, in part by connecting it more explicitly to a particular idea of nature, for which I will turn to John Sallis's work. Sallis argues that we need to think of il y a in what he terms the return of nature, a return after human thought has turned away from it. 7 thought has transformed the non-human via cognition, shaping it to legories and practices, that which correlates without remainder to object is an account of the nonand practices of the human. Sallis undermines this idea of nature by suggesting that it is something that returns, as strange, in the context ethat we ought to interpret nature as il y a, something strange and alien breaking through the familiar and foreseen.
il y a directly, as if one might be able to correlate word and object, and thus capture accurately the object in the conceptual description. Instead, Levinas describes il y a with a set of opposites, both of which cannot reasonably be thought simultaneously as part of an existent heavy density. Levinas does this so that we will not be able to think of il y a existing as such. In Sallis's idea of return, nature can only be indicatphrase. 8 The one side of the paradox interferes with the other in contradictory opposites are meant to indicate something beyond a being, an excess that cannot be captured in concepts we typically use il y a is pure existing without existents, it cannot be stated purely, univocally, directly, familiarly. In this way, what breaks through in nature's return is not another being that exists behind existent beings, but a presence in the absence of such beings. That is, it is neither a being nor purely nothing. Instead, this absence forces us to feel the strange fact of the there is, existing, opposites are meant to signal "absence that is a presence that is yet These opposites, and more generally il y a, are meant to signal the return of nature as absolutely strange, not recoverable into the familiar while breaking into it, perhaps evoking its return, the presence of nature can be viewed as a question of alterity.
Sallis adds to his understanding of il y a by moving to Levinas's discussion of the elemental. Levinas typically argues that we live from the elements, but also states that we live in them. Sallis glosses the latter as saying that the things of enjoyment are "not so much a matter of a background as of a medium (milieu) in which things take Ibid.) Sallis is arguing that the milieu in which we live as we live from it (enjoyment) is not a set of references between pieces of equipment, let alone objects constituted by the intentionality of pr (Ibid.) This central feature of the elemental is clearly a continuation of Levinas' discussion of the il y a, in that as a medium we do not and cannot possess it. It always already remains alien in this fundamenthis side takes form is not composed of things. It unfolds in its own in which the side of the element extends.... The depth of the element 9 Levinas is saying that the elemental is not a being or existent, but a milieu surface, which we might be forgiven to think about as breadth times length, but which abruptly changes to the single metaphor of depth, deliberately excluding it as the third dimension of Cartesian extension, and thus of determinate objects. Sallis argues that the introduction of the idea of a side is that the elemental "is indeterminate and ly a side, rather than all three dimensions, which would create determinate boundaries, making it side (or depth), the elemental is uncontainable. Sallis argues that the depth dimensio as a milieu unfolds "with a depth that is incommensurate with the Ibid.) Depth here is not just the potential surfaces hidden beneath each other sequentially, which could in p surfaces). Instead, depth indicates a way of not containing the elemental, extending as it does until it is lost in the unfathomable reaches of the earth and sky. There is no separation from the elemental in which we live, no distancing we would need to experience it has having a (determinate) surface close by or far away, to my right or left, in front of or behind me. Instead, "one is always within Ibid.) ilieu, it isn't itself a property of something substantive, a substance required to support it. This sort of stability would, in fact, mute the elemental by interpreting it as a 9 referred to parenthetically in the text as TI.
characteristic of an existent, as a trait of a being, an interpretation that the idea of a medium blocks. The elemental "comes to us from il y a, as existing without existents, where il y a is an abyss rather than solid gro the idea of inescapable milieu while keeping the notion of something breaking through, returning.
nIbid.) This isn't an ordinary hiding, where some thing hidden from view could in principle be uncovered if we were clever enough or if we had the right approach and perspective. Instead, the sort of concealment associated with the elemental is connected to revealing an absence. To put it in terms of concealment is, says Sallis, to draw attention to what Levinas himself describes as "an ever-new depth of absence, an existence without existent, the impersonal par way of existing without revealing itself, by which he means the familiar world of beings. Sallis glosses this as a "withdrawal into indicated with these indi -thing hidden from view, an indeterminate depth of materiality, of origin, a depth of absence, existence without existent. These are all indicators that conceptually we are always already too late, belatedly and inadequately naming a trace, an excess. This deepens our understanding of il y a, in particular its alterity, something absolutely strange.
In summary, Sallis has developed, from within Levinas's own thought an idea which depicts the non-human in terms of its nonpossession and its alterity, something that resists thought, but nevertheless an inescapable milieu within which we live. It breaks through -human precisely in our non-possessability of the elemental, the absolutely strange. Sallis' analysis gives us insight into nature in Levinasian terms, as the absolutely strange in its return.
ethical relation to the non-human. To move the argument forward, we can put Sallis's insight of nature in its return in the context of any number of Levinas's dualitiesobjectivity and transcendence. In each of these, Levinas is preoccupied by a movement in which the second disrupt Drabinski points out, "the movement beyond the totality departs from and within the experience of totality, confronting identity with 10 The idea of nature's return trip, experienced within example of this movement. Levinas's idea of attentiveness begins to explain how this is experienced. Levinas describes being attentive in points to ano consciousness, and presupposes the call of the other. To be attentive that does not originate from the self. The surplus signals a reversal of meaning-bestowal, meaning not generated by thought. It is this reversal that begins to uncover the ethical relation.
Levinas's idea of sensibility is important for understanding the reversal at the heart of attentiveness, especially as he develops it in of intentionality, something he takes to constitute cognition, Levinas argues that there are unsuspected, overlooked, and forgotten horiqualities that situate the subject in its thinking process. In order to se earth is not the base on which things appear, but the condition that 11 Levinas is saying that the subject, that the subject is located within these rprovide the support of situatedness required for thought. Levinas's lesson is that representation is ruined, by which he means, consciousness is dethroned from its status as sovereign, in what has consciousness toward its object-intentionality-is itself rooted in including particularly body and earth, also for its unsettling character. I would argue that the return of nature in its strangeness experienced in attentiveness is uncovered through the unsuspected horiLevinas interprets these "un to a being already stands within the being of that being (which and site that commands all positionthought by giving location and situatedness. The freedom of thought in its constituting role is situated in the belonging of the subject via only constituted by human cognition, but also is actively constituting it is not merely revealed but also reveals, not merely passive but also to the consciousness through which its being shines and, in doing so, arrow for the inten constitute a reverse arrow, as condition for the subject's ability to other, condition knowledge and being, in an a priori -neither an intolerable limitation of the thinker, nor a simple absorption of this other into the ego, in the form of a characteristics that Sallis rightly attributes to the elemental, namely, a milieu that is unpossessable, an uncontainability within which we ition and intentionality as rminately until they are lost in the unfathomable depths of the earth and bodiliness. Perhaps more to the point, they are the conditions that make possible the reversal of meaning-bestowal, which for Levinas is central to the ethical relation.
ecause without it, all meaning-giving concerning the other would be totally absorbed into the ego's representation of the Other, and thus become a mere function of not willed, but with which it cannot dispense, an ethical Sinngebung becomes possible, that is, a Sinngebung essentially respectful of the Ibid important work in order to reveal an ethical relation with the other, one in which the otherness of the other is respected. Levinas's early attempt to articulate a relation with the other in ethical terms is uses the term bestowal, the ethical relation does not originate with Instead, in "an ethical Sinngebung ow of intentionality is mportantly, gives rise to a relation of respect of the other as other. In this reversal, to put it in terms of our earlier argument, nature breaks resentations, returning in its strangeness as an ethical call to which we humans are compelled to respond with an ethical Sinngebung which is respectful of the other. The unsuswhose non-possession and alterity form the conditions for an ethical relation, experienced as something that calls us to respect the nonhuman as other.
This supports Sallis's insight that in Levinas's later writing he unduly restricts the human relation to the elemental because of his with the elements in which, precisely as enjoyment, they are interior eness to familiarity, from alterity to sameness. That is because Levinas uses the idea of alimentarity to explain enjoyment. In the joy of eating we take in the elements, as strange, and make them into the into ourselves. way, the all-encompassing way, of comporting oneself to the elemental?... Or could the elemental-as the elements extending into the there is, as the coupling of the elements with the there isprovoke an ible modes of relating to the elemental, different from alimentary relations, which remain true to Levinas's more general insights. Sallis's criticism of Levinas is that he unduly restricts the relation to elemental only through the lens of enjoyment via alimentarity, a primal standing relation to alterity disappears from the relation to but more basically the milieu in which one bathes, then its absolute strangeness is not reducible in relations with the elemental. The nd body, when connected to the elemental as here is uncovering relations to alterity through the elemental that wou al work of earth and body, namely, respecting the non-human through our experience of their strangeness. The elemental as milieu that comes through our unsus--human reveals an ethical Sinngebung respectful of the other. The responsive relation to the elemental, as milieu within which we live provides the resilient alterity which stubbornly supports the ethical relation to the nonhuman.
The idea of an ethical Sinngebung uncovered via unsuspected hothe elemental (and ultimately, il y a), helps us begin to see the possibility of an ethical relation to the non-
does not yet get in how an ethical respectfulness arises via its alterity, what is still missing is an account of possible ethical relations explicitly with nonhuman existents. On what basis might we claim an ethical relation to grass, ation to more complex existents such as lakes and rivers, forests and prairies, tundras and deserts? Or, even more abstractly, what about abstract phenomena such as the biosphere (the interconnected systems of living beings that encircles the globe) and the cryosphere (a similarly comprehensive interconnected system of ice and snow)? Is there an ethical Sinngebung that calls for respect toward these complex existents? Can they be experienced as having intrinsic and should not be reduced to the elemental or il y a-the non-human realm is more than the elemental. Thus there remains the issue of an ethical Sinngebung to non-human existents.
-human realm I have included a variety global systems. In doing so, I have of course represented them, in in categories such as living beings, ecosystems, and abstract global systems. This means we are back to the situation of reducing non-human existents to ation. If we are to uncover a possible ethical relation to non-human existents, we will need to uncover something within cognition, or more aptly in excess of it, to make explicit the possible ethical relation with non-human existents, something that I would argue would have to involve Sallis's idea of nature in its return.
To develop this, I would like to say a little more about the nature of at least some non-human existents, for which I would like to nas writes, "Sensibility constitutes the very egoism of the I, which is sentient and not
What is important here is that he depicts sensibility as the egoism of the I. Two things should of the body. Second, because sensibility constitutes the core of the ego, there is little reason to limit subjectivity to the human. Certainly, Levinas is talking about the egoism of the human I and arguably, the description of egoism leaves ample room for the idea that egoism more generally can occur in other, non-human sentient beings. Dogs way. 12 If we combine this with the earlier understanding of sensibility, namely that which is in excess to and resists thought, we can think of the possibility that all sentient beings exhibit something that resists representation, something we can posit in general as "ego- 13 The idea of sensibility can be used to depict the sentience of some non-human existents. Their sentience, depicted in this way, can be construed as to say this is that sensibility, central to sentient creatures, is a kind of subjectivity, one that resists representation. To support this claim, I would like to return to Levinas's idea of hyposhypostasis, that all sentient beings are upsurges in bare existence, achievements as a rupture or tear in the anonymity of il y a, achieved through the hollowing out of an inner space that can rightly be called subjective. That is, given that il y a is essentially anonymous and impersonal, 12 
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-ruptures of this anonymity are achievements toward subjectivity. Sentient existents are thus subjective by virtue of hypostasis, the event of their irruptions. Given Levinas's general description of ities in the non-human world are not explicitly excluded from this e process of hypostasis itself that suggests that human beings are the strations, including particularly the idea of consciousness, in fact his analysis that the upsurge and achievement are bodily in character points us in a more expansive direction. Given the bodily character of hypostasis, it seems arbitrary not to include at least some of the nonanimals, for example, exhibit many of the characteristics of subjectivexistence in the face of evanescence. 14 maple tree in my backyard too show the freedom of beginnings, an independence from its elemental milieu, a centred existence in the face of evanescence. 15 -human existents exhibit subjectivities that resist (cognitive) representation.
stems, are clearly no hypostatic-like characteristics, including internal dynamics, boundathe Southern Siberian steppes, and perhaps even global systems such as the biosphere and cryosphere, embody these traits. 16 physical forces, but are entities in their own right, in large part because they are dynamic systems exhibiting rudimentary autonomy characteristics of such selfenergy, matter and information with its sur fuelled by imported energy (e.g., solar) that can be changed into mechanical work as well as into energy-storing structures (e.g., biomass of various sorts) and energy-releasing processes, as well as into nonusable energy that is released into the environment (e.g., evaporato the system that are maintained far from thermodynamic equilib--linear, including complex feedinternal networks of relations, relatively autonomous from external constraints, maintaining internal hierarchies and stability by buffering inputs. 18 I would argue that these features can rightly be construed as particulars of hypostasis, and the resultant entities construed as irruptions from il y a, selfare not sentient or contained by a physical boundary such as a membrane or epidermis, their hypostatic features allows them to be considered nonclaims. In this they can be regarded as subjects that are able to not mean that these existents are on par with sentient creat claim, more modestly, is only that these also, in their own ways, can be plausibly and helpfully considered as irruptions of il y a, i.e., nonthought of as subjects exhibiting characteristics such as resilience representation-disruptions.
experience of the disruption of representation. There is nothing in our attentiveness that requires it to be exclusively oriented to the -human existents. I would argue that the excess constituting attention allows them to show themselves as hypostatic achievements irrupting from the elemental and the anonymity of il y a grounded in sensibility, which uncovers alterity, absolute strange-
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open us up particularly to the enigmatic experience of the selfexpression of the nonthe nonour intentional representations, and thus experiencing them as hypostatic achievements. Since as achievement hypostasis is simultaneously evanescent, I would suggest that in our attentiveness nonhuman existents reveal their vulnerability. To be a non-human existent is to be show vulnerability to demise and breakdown. Clearly this is something beyond il y a, for the anonymous there is is not the sort of being that is threatened at all, it is not an existent, and -human other vulnerable is that it is an existent, an upsurge in existing, a momentary and c ntiveness allows us to experience the non-human existent as an event that is structurally vulnerable.
-human existents can be undermined from below, threatened by il y a to collapse back into bare existing, they can also can also be proximal causes of breakdown, including centrally those brought on by our human insistence on our place in the sun. Thus, -human existents to an instrumental usefulness, to objects of thought, to barriers in need of destruction, or even to gifts offered to human others. In these ways, the well-being of non-human other is vulnerable to our human egoistic thought and action. The non-human other, precisely as existent, is vulnerable to becoming mere resource, eductions can easily mean that the non-human other suffers loss and harm, if not outright demise. That is, the non-human existent precisely as an event of hypostasis, as one that suffers continual evanescence and thus requiring ever new beginnings, is also an existent vulnerable to human reduction and exploitation, and thus is vulner--human existents can also affect the human subject, via sensibility, as an ethical Sinngebung.
It is here that I differ with those who advocate using Levinas's idea of the face as the paradigm for the ethical relation to the nonhuman. I would contend that the ethical relation does not always Levinas introduces the face to talk about the ethical relation, it is clear he does so to indicate the human as other. In order to argue for the non-human face, theorists would have to modify either the -human or introduce a supplement to make things more humanLevinas, that the face is reserved for the human ntion in this paper is that the face is not the only way to enter into an -human. There are Levinasian resources left to claim also an ethical relation to the nonhuman world. Perhaps oddly, not forcing the non-human realm to have faces might in fact create more room for an ethical relation to the nonrequirements of an intra-human ethical relation might allow for more nuanced ethical relations commensurate with the diversity of the non-human realm without making it appear on the one hand that the non-human is crypto-human or on the other to have to admit that the non-human is nothing more than instrumental equipment or objects of thought. That is, by not employing the trope of face we might in fact be able to open another space of otherness that isn't yet fully articulated in Levinas but is nevertheless compatible with his framework.
n-19 I would ntiveness to non-human existents. Waldenfels goes on to ask that, if this is so, by what criteria does Levinas restrict the face to humans? Waldenfels argues that the non-human can equally appeal and call us to responsibility. I agree with Waldenfels about the appeal from the non-human other, although I would parse it differently. I think we non-human existents? Given that we are invited to construe our entire sensorium as a responsorium, my take is that there is enough responsorium left over for it to be affected by the appeal of nonhuman existents, whether animals, plants, ecosystems, bioregions or global systems such as the biosphere or cryosphere. reminds us, for Levinas "responsibility accrues to a subject that is marked, at the deepest level of its experience, by its sensibility, which brings it into the other's proximity, or by its vulnerability with onsequence, ethical sensibility is an 20 What I take
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The Cambridge Companion to Levinas from this is that the non-human existent, precisely in its strangeness, in nature's return through it, in its excess of representation, affects us humans in such a way as to mark an ethical relation. Our attentiveness to the non-human existent shows up as an ethical sensibility that comes to us from the non-human other. Waldenfels suggests, "Levinas's ethics are rooted in a phenomenology of the body.... It is the hungering, thirsting, enjoying, suffering, working, loving, murdering human being in all its corporeality (Leibhaftigkeit) whose 21 that sentient non-human existents such as chickens (to use an odd example) also hunger, thirst, enjoy, and suffer. I would argue that these empirical states are important to the extent that they point to generally, the vulnerability of other, complex non-human existents reveals an ethical relation, uncovering something that is at stake for the non-human existent.
object precisely because its expressive life consists in undoing what 22 I would argue that non-human existent can express in this way, where such expression is both a manifestation and a hiding. In its presence it is also absent, showing itself as an -human existents can rightly be represented, at the same time they unsettle t intentional arrow, from its constituting function that would conceptuali --human existents, as hypostatic achievements, express themselves by disrruption that opens up the space for ethical meaning-bestowal by the non-human existent, where ethics simply means, at its minimum, the "calling into question of my spontaneity by the presence of the The non-human existent is not a merely passive, determinate object that can be adequated with my themati disturbance as ethical meaning-bestowal, originating from outside of me-there is something about the non-human existent in which such affection originates. That is, the non-human existent doesn't just appear to me-it expresses. I am suggesting that it is the sort of existent that "at each moment des 21 22 Drabinski, Sensibility and Singularity -human existents express, which in our attentiveness we experience as an absolute difference unsettling our representations of them, and in doing so reversing the arrow of meaning-bestowal, which shows up as an ethical relation, an ethical Sinngebung that is respectful of the other.
Levinas uses the Greek phrase kath auto to name this, by which breaks through all envelopings Ibid.) Levinas is saying that precisely because the existent is an achievement as an upsurge in existing, the existent expresses itself to me beyond the representing function of my thought in which I equate the existent with my categories of cognition. I am suggesting that, as existents, non-human beings also manifest kath auto. The manifestation of the non-human as existent, as upsurge in its achievement, shows up in my awareness as the existent's kath auto "kath auto consists in a being telling itself to us independently of every position t is not a matter of the incoming sensibility helping us choose which interstill be maintaining -human existent undoes our themes without replacing them with other ones. In this move, says Drabinski, Levinas is attempting "to alter sensibility from the posterior status of the sensible as constituted to the sensible as a self-(i.e., expression and kath auto 23 Sensibility is given the transcendental role of constituting rather than the conditioned role of being constituted. This means that for Levinas sensibility is absolute difference, not merely blind protocognition. Sensibility is, at its deepest icient by thought. Instead, it is the responsorium that maintains an awareness of absolute difference, also of non-human existents, attentiveness to an independence that cannot be completely cognitively grasped.
In other words, even without the notion of a face, we can envision the non-human existent as expressing an ethical claim on us as humans. Clearly, in its vulnerability it cannot physically stop itself from being harmed (reduced, exploited, degraded, destroyed), for kath auto. It can express itself in a way that reveals the arbitrariness if not violence of i-tation of non-human existents. The very vulnerability of the nonhuman existent functions at the same time as its self-expression, namely, an appeal to do the non-human existent good. In Levinas's scheme, for any existent to be an existent, it is not merely an instance of a kind, but a concrete, irreplaceable achievement. The fact that they are existents means in Levinas's scheme they are singular upsurges in existing which, as existents, are thus vulnerable, they also self-express (kath auto), something which disturbs us as human existents, via an ethical appeal. This seems reason enough to suggest that non-human existents are the sorts of existents with which we humans can enter ethical relations of responsibility. 24 Take our relation to animals in the meat production of industrial agriculture, as an example. Clearly, the production of say, chicken of an animal species to a commodity for human exploitation. 25 Domestic meat chickens, called broilers, are particular varieties (often now Cornishbroiler, which names a post-production domestic cooking process, reduces the omaximum breast and thigh meat, are aimed at human interests.
existents, with their own characteristic norms for well-being in their attempts to cope with their extremely controlled environment. 26 ar and the vari- 27 In my terms, the hypostatic achievement that constitutes the chicken as sentient existent makes it vulnerable, not only to evanescence generally but also to human exploitation that causes fear and pain. One perhaps small example is the stress of walking caused by leg weakness relative to body weight, a high-incidence condition in many 24 See Llewelyn, Seeing Through God broiler populations and of great economic concern for producers. 28 an fashion, that attentiveness to chickens in nature's return disrupts our representation of them as ation by ically with each step they might take. 29 This vulnerability and suffering functions at the same time as a self-expression, namely, an appeal -human existents they are upsurges that self-express (kath auto), disturbing us with an ethical appeal, an ethical Sinngebung that call humans to be respectful of them as existents.
I would argue that the same is true, albeit in a somewhat different way, of our relations to more complex and abstract existents such as se are not sentient, I have argued above that they are hypostatic achievements, including particularly hypostatic traits of resilience and vulnerability. 30 rically we have not paid them much attention, except as merely the environment within which we live, or more intrusively as inexhaustrepository of our waste. I would argue that when we are attentive to kath auto) something beyond our instrumental representations, including particularly their vulnerability to our human actions. 31 the data as documented in the annual reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change discloses the fragility of the global earth, including its current envelop of biotic life we call the biosphere. 32 Ihde calls "earth-as-33 breaks through the data points of temperature, ice thicknesses, sea-level, and so on, by disclosing the rmation about global climate. Through the disclosure of the global earth's fragility, we become aware, in Levinas's sense, of the vulnerexistent is the biosphere is able to suffer loss and harm. 34 life, earth-as-planet's perishability can be construed as an ethical meaning-bestowal expressed by this abstract non-human existent, providing an unsettling that opens up the possibility responsibility toward it. 35 That is, our ethical relation to ecosystems, bioregions and the earth-as-planet is also based in nature in its return, an absolute difference between our themati kath auto of these interrelated non-human existents. In their resistance to our themathat might undermine our human exploitative proclivities for control and degradation.
he basis of two early Levinasian ideas, il y a and hypostasis, the possibility of an ethical relation that extends beyond the human, to the non-human relation is not yet an ethical theory in the more usual sense of answering questions such as "what ought I do "Levinas is not in the business of constructing normative moral Levinas's thought has anythin something she resolves with the idea that his is "normativity without 36 to do, i.e., developing concrete social norms for environmental action, would require explicating what Levinas calls politics, something he arrives at via his notion of the third party. 37 mthat "The fact that the other, my neighbor, is also a third party with respect to another, who is also a neighbor, is the birth of thought, 38 In a nutshell, society emerges with the third party and, along with that, the conscious, thoughtful, principled development of social norms that are responses to the normativity of the ethical relation to the non-human Perpich and others 39 , it is here that we might rightly seek Levinasian answers to the political question of how we might collectively live and act based in an ethical Sinngebung that is respectful of nonhuman existents. 
